Dr. Saud Al-Sharafat, Director of the Shorufat Center for Globalization and Terrorism Studies
For over two decades, the Arab region has been caught in the crossfire of an escalating geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This rivalry has taken multiple forms—from proxy wars and economic sanctions to covert operations and limited military confrontations—culminating in high-level negotiations that often exclude Arab actors from the equation.
Despite shifting administrations in Washington and evolving regional dynamics, one constant remains: the systemic absence of a unified Arab position. Arab states have consistently failed to produce an independent strategic framework—one that articulates and defends their national and regional interests outside the binaries of global and regional power alignments. This absence cannot be attributed solely to limited resources or internal distractions. Rather, it reflects a deeper crisis: a lack of political will to formulate a coherent Arab vision, and a chronic deficiency in sovereign strategic thinking.
This vacuum has allowed external actors—namely the United States, Iran, and Israel—to dominate the regional agenda, relegating Arab countries to the roles of financiers, proxies, or battlegrounds. Recent U.S. rhetoric, especially during the Trump administration, reveals a pragmatic shift away from regime change in Tehran. Instead, Washington framed Iran’s political future as an internal matter to be decided by the Iranian people. This narrative, while seemingly respectful of self-determination, actually signals a recalibration of American priorities: to contain and balance rather than dismantle. Notably, such restraint was absent in U.S. approaches to Syria and Libya, exposing a stark double standard in regional security policy.
Based on current trends, three plausible scenarios emerge for the future of U.S.-Iran relations:
1. A temporary tactical alliance that reconfigures spheres of influence.
2. Open hostility that fuels perpetual instability and arms sales.
3. A transactional settlement that formalizes the existing balance of power.
In all three cases, the Arab world stands to lose. In the first, Iran is legitimized as a regional power. In the second, Arab states are consumed as theaters of conflict. In the third, regional maps are redrawn above their heads. This bleak outlook persists despite the Arabs’ significant assets—geostrategic location, natural resources, and cultural depth
The problem lies not in capacity but in the absence of strategic sovereignty and collective vision. Equally troubling is the exclusion of the Arab citizen from public life. In many states, individuals are reduced to passive spectators who’s only expected roles are loyalty and celebration. Stripped of agency, how can such a citizen defend sovereignty or identity
In this context, advocating for a “third Arab option” becomes not only desirable but essential. This path does not represent neutrality or isolationism, but a proactive strategy based on:
Internal Arab alliances that transcend temporary disputes-
Independent decision-making free from foreign dependency-
A redefined Arab security doctrine aligned with Arab realities-
Comprehensive domestic reforms to ensure political and social resilience-
Although ambitious, this vision is not utopian. As long as Arab states remain trapped in rigid binaries—either with or against Iran, with or against the U.S.—they will forfeit agency and endure prolonged vulnerability
