Implications for Jordan’s National Security
Saud Al-Sharafat
Founder and Director, Shorufat Center for Globalization and Terrorism Studies.
Amman-Jordan
The detention facilities holding ISIS-affiliated individuals in northeastern Syria—most notably Gweiran Prison, Al-Shaddadi Prison, and Al-Hol Camp—constitute one of the most critical unresolved security challenges in the post-territorial phase of the organization. These facilities house large concentrations of ISIS fighters, their families, and ideological support networks under conditions marked by structural fragility and increasing political contestation. Available and corroborated data indicate that between 10,000 and 12,000 ISIS members are currently detained in prisons administered by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), alongside more than 38,000 women and children residing in ISIS-linked displacement camps, primarily Al-Hol Camp, which international monitoring bodies consistently identify as a high-risk environment for sustained radicalization and extremist socialization.
From a Jordanian perspective, this issue extends beyond the scope of an internal Syrian security challenge and represents a direct national security concern. The geographic location of these detention facilities is operationally connected to the Syrian Badia, a historically permissive terrain characterized by porous borders, illicit trafficking routes, and the mobility of armed actors. Any degradation or collapse of the detention architecture—whether through mass escape events, institutional breakdown, or unregulated transfer of authority—would effectively reintroduce thousands of experienced extremist operatives into an active regional theater in proximity to Jordan’s eastern and northeastern borders. Such developments would significantly increase the likelihood of cross-border infiltration, the reactivation of dormant extremist cells, and the expansion of transnational facilitation networks across the Syria–Iraq–Jordan border triangle, including the Tanf and Rukban corridors.
The strategic sensitivity of this file has intensified in light of accelerating political negotiations between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian interim government, in which the future control of detention facilities and camps has become a central component of broader discussions on sovereignty and territorial reintegration. While primarily political in nature, these negotiations carry substantial security implications. Any transition of authority that lacks clearly defined legal mandates, security guarantees, and international oversight risks generating temporary security vacuums, localized armed confrontations, or partial loss of control. Previous incidents—including clashes, unrest, and escape attempts—demonstrate that detention facilities holding ISIS members remain highly vulnerable during periods of political uncertainty. For Jordan, the politicization of the detention file transforms a relatively contained risk into a fluid and unpredictable threat environment.
The challenge is further compounded by the presence of detainees and camp residents from a wide range of foreign nationalities, including a limited number of Jordanian nationals, estimated at fewer than ten individuals since 2020. It is nonetheless important to contextualize this within the broader historical record: Jordanian foreign fighters ranked second only to Tunisians among national contingents that joined ISIS and other jihadist organizations during the peak recruitment period between 2012 and 2014. This legacy continues to shape Jordan’s exposure to the downstream effects of unresolved detention and repatriation policies. The issue presents complex legal, judicial, and security dilemmas related to prosecution, citizenship status, post-release monitoring, and reintegration. Moreover, any future international settlement imposed without robust legal and security frameworks would constitute a direct pressure point on Jordan’s internal security architecture. The large population of children in camps such as Al-Hol further represents a long-term strategic risk, not solely from a humanitarian perspective, but as a potential incubator for the next generation of transnational violent extremism.
Beyond immediate security concerns, ISIS detention facilities constitute a strategic intelligence repository, containing critical information on organizational hierarchies, financing streams, logistical corridors, recruitment pathways, and both active and dormant support networks across the region. The erosion of detention control or the transfer of authority in the absence of effective international coordination would likely result in the loss, fragmentation, or leakage of this intelligence, thereby degrading the preventive and anticipatory capabilities of neighboring states, with Jordan among the most directly affected.
From the standpoint of Jordanian national security, the ISIS detention and camp file in northeastern Syria should be understood as a deferred but escalating threat, one that intensifies with each uncalculated political shift affecting governance and control over these facilities. Consequently, Jordan’s engagement with this issue must be anchored in its classification as a core national security priority. This necessitates sustained intelligence vigilance, proactive scenario planning for detention-failure contingencies, and multi-layered security and intelligence coordination, particularly with the United States and relevant Syrian actors. Equally important is Jordan’s consistent opposition to any regional or international arrangements that risk emptying detention facilities or recycling extremist threats under inadequately regulated political or humanitarian frameworks.
